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The proposal from Russian President Dmitri Medvedev for a new 
European security architecture enlivened the debate about the 
relationship between the EU and Russia. Yet, under the term security, the 
Russians understand something different than the EU with her concept of 
soft power. New forums are needed in order to finally come to a common 
understanding about future affairs in the region. 
Twenty years after the fall of the Berlin 
wall, the West has failed to effectively 
incorporate the Russian Federation into 
security institutions in Europe. The 
consequences of this deficiency reach from 
the recurrent reigniting of “frozen” 
conflicts and gas rows to a growing 
inability in Europe to successfully confront 
common challenges of the 21st century. 
This realization, coupled with the new 
security orientations that accompanied 
administration changes in both 
Washington and Moscow, offers a chance 
to harmonize EU policy and relations with 
the United States, Russia and the Eastern 
neighborhood. 
 
Latest concessions of the Obama 
administration in Eastern Europe show the 
extent to which the United States will 
have its hands tied in potential conflicts 
between Russia and the “near abroad”. The 
cancellation of the placement of anti-
missile defense systems in Poland and the 
Czech Republic not only marks a turning 
point in relations between Washington and 
Moscow, but also signalizes at least in the 
medium term a fundamental alteration in 
the security situation on the eastern 
borders of the EU. This evolving security 
reality demands a more proactive role of 
the EU in fostering positive cooperation 
with Russia in the common neighborhood 
in general and in conflict prevention in 
particular. A combination of existing and 
developing instruments lend themselves to 
this end: the Eastern Partnership (EaP), 
the dialogue over President Medvedev’s 
proposal for a new European security 
architecture, a new “Euro-Atlantic Security 
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Council” within the OSCE, the Four 
Common Spaces and a new partnership 
agreement between the EU and Russia. 
 
I 
Dmitri Medvedev’s 
Security Strategy 
Initially put forward in June 2008, 
President Medvedev’s proposal for a “new 
European security architecture from 
Vancouver to Vladivostok” must be 
considered in the context of other security 
documents and statements of his 
administration. Of these, the most 
important include the five guiding foreign 
policy principles of the Russian 
Federation, announced in an interview 
with Euronews in September 2008 and the 
National Security Strategy of the Russian 
Federation until 2020, ratified by 
presidential fiat on May 12, 2009. 
 
After the war in Georgia, two of the five 
guiding principles deserve particular 
attention: point 4 emphasizes the 
protection of Russian citizens also abroad 
as a foreign policy priority and point 5 
defines certain regions as “regions of 
privileged interest” for the Russian 
Federation. In the case of Georgia or 
Ukraine, such a position rejects the 
endeavors of these countries to acquire 
NATO membership or accept military 
bases from western countries. 
 
Much more detailed than the guidelines 
for the foreign policy of the Russian 
Federation, the national security strategy 
from May 2009 serves the purpose of 
creating a common basis for the work of 
various actors in the security sector.     
However, it is precisely the lack of 
coordination and synthesis of the different 
sections in this document that alludes to 
interministerial disagreement on security. 
In this respect, the 
security strategy 
of the Russian 
Federation under 
Medvedev remains 
relatively 
ambiguous as to 
what extent the 
document will 
actually guide the 
relevant security 
actors.  
 
Most apparently, 
the national 
security strategy 
accentuates the 
importance of 
national economic 
development for 
the security of the country: socioeconomic 
goals comprise 5 out of 7 of the 
measurable criteria by which progress in 
the security situation will be measured in 
the future: unemployment, Gini 
coefficient, the development of consumer 
prices, national and foreign debt of the 
state as a percent of GDP and the level of 
resources provided to sectors of health, 
culture, education and sciences as a 
percent of GDP. Only the last two points 
refer to military power: the annual level of 
innovation in areas of military and 
armament and the degree to which human 
resources can be guaranteed in areas of 
military, technology and engineering. 
  
s
p
o
t
l
i
g
h
t
 
e
u
r
o
p
e
 
 
 
 
C
o
o
p
e
r
a
t
i
o
n
 
w
i
t
h
 
t
h
e
 
K
r
e
m
l
i
n
 
 
P
a
g
e
 
3
 
#
 
2
0
1
0
/
0
1
Despite both the weight given to the 
concept of security through development 
apparent in the strategy document until 
2020 and the recognition of the 
importance of soft power, the Russian 
leadership has thus far perceived national 
economic development only as a means to 
enable its assertion on a global scale 
rather than as a means to ensure long-
term stability through increased 
prosperity on its borders, as is the case in 
the EU security strategy. In the context of 
the “sphere of privileged interests” 
rhetoric, Russia offers the countries of the 
common neighborhood with the EU few 
incentives for convergence with the 
Russian development paradigm. 
 
Because in his speech in Berlin, President 
Medvedev explicitly appealed to the EU 
member countries to participate in a 
summit on the topic as individual 
countries rather than in blocks or as a 
group, many western countries responded 
with the suspicion that the proposal 
served merely to “divide and conquer”. 
Moreover, many of the later defined 
details of the draft proposal, finally 
published on the Kremlininin website 
November 29, 2009, lacked originality. 
These aspects included: 1) respect for the 
territorial integrity of all countries; 2) 
prohibition of the use of force as well as 
the threat to use force; 3) insurance of 
equal security for all (this point alludes to 
restrictions on military alliances such as 
NATO that threaten, according to 
Medvedev, the security of some non-
members) and; 4) the rejection of an 
exclusive right of one state or organization 
to maintain security in Europe (yet a 
further reference to NATO). 
 
In particular, points 3 and 4 aim 
unmistakably at the weakening of NATO’s 
role in Europe and the first two points 
already exist in international law. 
However, a novelty does exist in the 
legally binding character proposed in 
which all of these points would be unified. 
For the security dilemma in the EU 
neighborhood, the first two points carry 
special relevance. Against the background 
of the war in Georgia, in which Russian 
troops advanced beyond Abkhazia and 
South Ossetia into Georgia proper, central 
and eastern European countries condemn 
Russia for a lack of respect for territorial 
integrity and sovereignty of their 
countries. While the “Report of the 
Independent International Fact-Finding 
Mission on the Conflict in Georgia” found 
Georgia responsible for the first strike in 
the conflict in South Ossetia, it 
admonished Moscow for its dispro-
portionate reaction and illegal invasion 
into Georgian territory beyond the 
enclaves. 
 
Interestingly, the proposal from President 
Medvedev focuses exclusively on hard 
security and military defense, which 
fundamentally diverges from the 
comprehensive EU security concept based 
on “spreading good governance, 
supporting social and political reform, 
dealing with corruption and abuse of 
power, establishing the rule of law and 
protecting human rights” as the best 
means to ensure security. While one could 
argue that the EU can only afford to focus 
on soft power because of the hard security 
guarantee from the United States and 
NATO, the fact remains that the security 
reality in Europe over the last decades has 
changed normative perceptions in the EU 
about the desired means and ends of a 
secure Europe. 
 
Although aspects of democracy and human 
rights do not find explicit mention in 
Moscow’s proposed treaty, President 
Medvedev offered the EU an open dialogue 
about these issues in June 2008 during his 
stay in Berlin and underlined the 
“humanistic ideals and values that are 
shared by all of Europe and are an integral 
part of the culture of Russia and the 
unified Germany.” He moreover appealed 
to a common European identity and 
foundations of democracy, which also in 
Russia find their roots in Roman, 
Germanic and French law. 
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II 
And the EU? 
When it comes to relations with its eastern 
neighbors and with Russia, both “old” and 
“new” member countries struggle to come 
to agreement on the proper course. While 
Poland, Estonia, Sweden and England tend 
toward scepticism in dealings with Russia, 
Germany, Italy, France and Hungary 
actively seek deeper cooperation. Not able 
to establish concordance as a union, 
member states often conclude bilateral 
agreements with Russia rather than 
collective ones. One can only hope that 
through the Lisbon treaty and the High 
Representative for Foreign and Security 
Policy the EU will become more consistent 
not only in its strategic documents, but in 
practice as well. So that the EU can act 
with a unified voice and meet regional as 
well as international challenges, new 
forums are needed which promote a 
process of vetting the many diverging 
security interests and perceptions and 
building consensus. After all, as the 
European Council on Foreign Relations 
emphasized, the EU’s most powerful 
leverage lies in its unity. 
 
III 
Incorporating Russia 
An overarching lack of consequence and a 
common perception of security interests in 
the shared neighborhood presents the 
most significant hitherto existing 
challenge for EU policies toward the 
Russian Federation. In regards to 
modernization promotion in the 
neighboring countries for example, the EU 
continually insists that the EaP is not 
aimed against Russia. Objectively, that is 
true. However, in the politics of security, 
perceptions of intensions outweigh the 
importance of the intensions themselves. 
In exactly this manner, Moscow can argue 
that it poses no threat to Central and 
Eastern European countries. As long as 
these countries feel threatened, they will 
have a reason to block the further 
incorporation of Russia into European 
institutions. Consequently, it is imperative 
that the EU replace the practice of 
“clarification” of intentions with practical 
confidence-building measures in order to 
bring these diverging perceptions closer 
together in the long term. In a first step, 
cooperation in areas of shared interest 
such as conflict prevention, energy 
security and economic cooperation have 
the most potential for success. 
 
While both the EU and Russian Federation 
identified these areas as those of common 
interest, the EU only then can expect 
constructive cooperation with Russia when 
Moscow perceives that its security 
interests are being taken seriously. 
Although President Medvedev welcomes 
the latest antimissile defense decision, the 
point of the matter is not just whether the 
E U ,  U S  o r  N A T O  m a k e  a  d e c i s i o n  i n  
Moscow’s favor, but whether Moscow is 
allowed to participate on level with these 
actors in an institutionalized decision-
making process. 
 
Despite the isolated concessions and the 
rhetoric of perezagruzka, the perception in 
Moscow persists that the US “will never 
allow the Europeans or the Russians 
access to the button,” as Dmitri Rogozin 
expressed in Berlin this November. For 
this reason, it would be an illusion to 
expect that Moscow will settle for their 
position within the framework of the 
NATO Russia Council. Regardless of the 
actual intentions of NATO or the US, due 
to Russia’s perceptions of them, its 
incorporation into the security 
architecture in Europe must occur 
independently from but parallel to NATO: 
independently because a new council is 
needed that Russia can help shape from 
the very beginning and parallel because 
most EU states still see NATO and its US 
participation as the preferred institution 
for providing security in Europe. While it 
would run contrary to European interests 
to devalue NATO, the EU should not wait 
for a proposed solution from Washington,  
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but rather take the initiative to explore 
possibilities for a more effective and 
institutionalized inclusion of Russia in the 
future of European security. 
 
Due to the broad participation in the 
OSCE, the organization should seize the 
suggestion of the Aspen European 
Strategic Forum and found a “Euro-
Atlantic Security Council” within the 
OSCE. The new council would encounter 
more acceptance in Moscow and could 
improve the reputation of the organization 
on both a political and working level as 
one that is quick to act and dynamic in its 
responses. In particular, this council could 
formulate a common security strategy for 
new, shared security challenges. The fight 
against narcotics trade and Islamic 
extremism would lend themselves as pilot 
projects. Although the NATO-Russia 
Council could also deal with these topics, 
Moscow does not feel adequately included 
in decision-making processes and 
treatment of them in a new council would 
have a different character. 
 
J u s t  a s  N A T O  i s  c u r r e n t l y  r e v i s i n g  i t s  
strategic concept, a Euro-Atlantic Council 
could formulate a common concept and 
threat perception with the difference that 
Russia would also enjoy decision-making 
rights on the topics defined as falling 
within its mandate. Fundamental 
questions of NATO enlargement and others 
would still reside in NATO while the main 
responsibility for areas defined by the new 
strategic concept could be anchored within 
the new Euro-Atlantic Council. The new 
council could, for instance, deal with the 
changes to the Treaty on Conventional 
Armed Forces in Europe (CFE), necessary 
since the last NATO enlargement, in order 
to reach progress in an important area of 
hard security. Furthermore, it is worth 
consideration whether certain decisions of 
the Euro-Atlantic Council could be 
executed through projects within the 
framework of the EaP. 
 
 
 
IV 
The New Ostpolitik 
Through the incorporation of Romania and 
Bulgaria in 2007, the EU moved into a 
wider neighborhood, reaching the Black 
Sea and thus directly bordering not only 
the frozen conflicts of Southeast Europe, 
but also those of the Caucasus. 
Consequently, a new security policy that 
would effectively combat the insecurity of 
neighboring states reached a heightened 
level of prioritization. Launched in May 
2009, the Eastern Partnership served as 
an attempt to utilize the EU’s soft power 
strength not only for prosperity but for 
stability promotion in the region and the 
effective resolution of frozen conflicts that 
would reach beyond the ad hoc nature of 
previous EU involvement in conflict 
resolution. In order to succeed in this 
endeavor, the EU must retain its 
legitimacy as a soft power by excelling at 
that what it does best: trade and economic 
spheres, development, environmental and 
consumer protection policies and the area 
of culture.  
 
Indeed, the EaP offers an approach for a 
solution to the prior inadequacies of the 
ENP. Firstly, the “eastern European 
neighbors” receive the necessary 
prioritization in comparison to “Europe’s 
neighbors” in the Union for the 
Mediterranean, as the EaP will receive an 
additional 75 percent increase of funding 
through the European Neighbourhood and 
Partnership Instrument. Beyond this 
symbolic value however, the EaP, if 
successfully carried through, will lead to 
more convergence with the EU without 
promising membership, but also without 
eliminating this possibility in the future. 
Moreover, because of more tailored 
agreements, more self-responsibility and 
ownership ensues and further convergence 
with the EU gains an increasingly 
performance-based character. 
 
The EaP presents a new approach to 
Ostpolitik precisely because it does not  
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propose old patterns of integration, but 
rather offers a convergence that depends 
on the reform will of the individual state. 
Whereas the older members of the EU 
possess few carrots or sticks to induce 
reform in new member states, it leaves the 
membership question open for the time 
being, which enables it to offer gradual 
incentives through additional convergence 
funds. Instead of 
relinquishing all possibilities 
for influence at once, the EU 
offers incentives for various 
policy areas such as for a visa 
regime or for a free trade 
zone.  
 
Concerning the further 
development of the EaP, 
which does not envision the 
institutionalized participation 
of Russia, the biggest 
challenge for the success of 
the initiative consists of the 
diverging perceptions of 
security interests of Russia 
and the EU. The EU speaks 
about stability and implies 
long-term modernization that 
leads to stability and the 
resolution of frozen conflicts. 
Russia on the other hand, 
concentrates on hard security. 
On an official level, Moscow 
regrets that the EU rarely 
addresses hard security 
issues explicitly in its 
conversations about its 
eastern neighbors. Where 
security notions converge, 
namely in crisis management, 
the EU and Russia could work 
together within the EaP. The 
conflict in Transnistria offers 
promising possibilities for a 
first step in security 
cooperation in the shared 
neighborhood. Furthermore, 
rapproche-ment between 
Turkey and Armenia could be 
utilized to encourage a 
settlement of the Nagorno-
Karabakh conflict. As Russia 
plays a central role in both 
conflicts and Moscow 
expressed desire to 
cooperation in the area of crisis 
management, resolution of these conflicts— 
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in addition to the immediate added value—
would send a signal to the EU that Moscow 
is serious about its constructive proposal 
for a new European security architecture. 
 
So that in a best case scenario, the 
convergence of the Eastern European 
neighborhood countries could coincide 
with convergence with Russia in areas of 
common interest, the EU needs a new PCA 
with Russia. At the moment, too much 
overlap exists between the outdated PCA 
from 1994 and the four common spaces, 
which have been implemented since 2005. 
The EU would be well advised to evaluate 
which of the four spaces (Common 
Economic Space, Space of Freedom, 
Security and Justice, Space on External 
Security and that on Research, Education, 
Culture) have made progress thus far and 
in which of these spaces advancements 
can be expected. The EU should then 
foster these areas. 
 
Due to the absence of the US in the 
common space on external security, 
cooperation in this area has been 
ineffective. Against this background, this 
common space lends itself all the more to 
a more inclusive forum such as the 
proposed Euro-Atlantic Council, as 
security issues in Europe will not be 
managed without the US and NATO in the 
near future. In the PCA as well as the four 
common spaces, economic cooperation 
presents the area with by far the most 
progress and potential for its successful 
further development from a standpoint of 
mutual interests. As suggested by Moscow 
political scientist Andrei Zagorski, the EU 
could work to merge the sectoral economic 
dialogues into a new partnership 
agreement and thereby induce a targeted 
promotion of these areas. Moreover, 
further cooperation in the complementary 
area of Freedom, Security and Justice, 
which seeks to improve the legal 
conditions for a gradual liberalization of 
trade relations, could set the groundwork 
for Russia to join the WTO and lead to 
more convergence with the neighborhood 
and with the EU. Following entry into the 
WTO, a free trade zone could be gradually 
established. 
 
Through the modernization and 
diversification of the Russian economy as 
well as through the growing middle class 
that this would generate, the EU can most 
effectively contribute to long-term political 
modernization. Also, the potential impact 
of increased exchanges in the area of 
culture and civil society presents an 
aspect of convergence between Russia and 
the EU that should not be underestimated. 
Visa facilitation on an EU level would be 
the most important single step toward 
advancing these exchanges.  
 
It will prove difficult if not impossible to 
receive a positive reaction from Moscow to 
the Eastern Partnership as long as the 
overarching relations, in particular in the 
area of security, remain unsettled. For this 
reason, the EU should respond positively 
to Dmitri Medvedev’s proposal and engage 
in dialogue with Moscow in order to 
produce a more detailed version. After all, 
one should not forget that the Helsinki 
Accords from 1975 emanated from a 
Soviet proposal. Through dialogue and 
joint revision as well as concretization of 
the proposal, a mutually beneficial 
agreement could emerge.  
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